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Under what conditions is a person a at time t the 
same person as a person b at a later time t’? This is the 
problem of personal identity over time. In this paper, I wish 
to argue that there is a necessary (though not sufficient) 
epistemic condition for identity. I will explain this condition 
and offer some support for it. I will then discuss a case - 
religious conversion - where it is arguable both that the 
necessary condition fails to obtain and that there is a 
failure of identity. If the case displays a fruitful co-incidence 
between these two failures, that will be some evidence in 
favor of my necessary condition. 
The epistemic condition I have in mind derives 
from Bas van Fraassen’s Principle of Reflection: 
(Reflection) Pa,t(Q|Pb,t’(Q)=r)=r. 
This principle requires that a, at t, believes Q to 
degree r conditionally on b’s believing Q to degree r at t’. 
Van Fraassen (1984) argues that, when b=a, Reflection is 
a requirement of rationality. My claim is 
(R) Conformity to Reflection is a necessary 
condition for the identity of a and b. 
Let me begin by saying some of what conformity to 
Reflection does not involve. First, it does not require that 
one’s beliefs undergo no change. The question that will 
concern us is rather, what kinds of belief change, and how 
much of it, is consistent with Reflection, and hence with 
identity. Secondly, there are usually many hypotheses 
about what our future degrees of belief might be. Satisfying 
Reflection involves instantiating the schema above for all 
hypotheses about future degrees of belief. But since we 
will rarely have any reason to accept any particular 
hypothesis about what those future degrees of belief will 
be, satisfying Reflection will rarely have any consequences 
for our current unconditional degrees of belief. Thirdly, and 
perhaps most importantly, I take conformity to Reflection to 
be a matter of degree. One can conform to the principle (to 
a high degree) even if one does not satisfy every instance 
of it. Since there is vagueness in what counts as a high 
degree of conformity, there will be, on (R), a corresponding 
vagueness in the concept of personal identity. Since, I 
believe, any plausible account of personal identity should 
recognize its vagueness, this is fine. What is important is 
whether (R) captures the ‘right’ vagueness for personal 
identity. This is what I shall be putting to the test when we 
come to conversion. 
What supports (R)? Reflection has the form of 
what Gaifman (1985) calls an expert function. b is an 
expert for a if learning what b’s degrees of belief are is 
enough for a to make them her own. (R) thus implies that a 
necessary condition of the identity of a at t and b at t’ is 
that b should be an expert for a - we must take our future 
selves as expert relative to our present selves. The basic 
idea behind taking one’s future selves as expert is what I 
call normal epistemic change. A preliminary 
characterization of this notion (to be refined below) is 
change in epistemic state that occurs for one of three 
reasons: a) we acquire new information; b) we acquire new 
skills in interpreting information; c) we apply (more 
carefully) our skills to our information. Under normal 
circumstances, changes in epistemic state arising from any 
of these causes will make us more expert. Hence, if all our 
epistemic change is normal, our future selves will be 
expert relative to our present selves, and we should satisfy 
Reflection with respect to them. (R) follows from this 
connection between normal epistemic change and 
Reflection if we make the following connection between 
identity and normal epistemic change: 
(P) A person ceases to exist by undergoing too 
much abnormal epistemic change. 
(‘Too much’ is vague in the same way that ‘high 
degree’ above was vague.) 
If we assume that where there is normal epistemic 
change Reflection should hold, we must consider (P), and 
the link between (ab)normal epistemic change and identity, 
to see whether, ultimately, we should accept (R). The 
literature is replete with apparent counter-examples to 
Reflection of the following kind. Take the hypothesis that, 
as a result of hypnosis, I will later believe I am a pumpkin. 
Reflection would have me now believe, given that 
hypothesis, that I am a pumpkin. But that is absurd. In this 
example, the epistemic change between my current state, 
in which I do not believe I am a pumpkin, and my future 
state, in which I do, is abnormal: it is induced by hypnosis. 
Most of the counter-examples to Reflection are variants of 
this case and involve intuitively abnormal epistemic 
change. But since (P) only requires that a person cannot 
undergo too much abnormal epistemic change, we need 
not argue that identity is not preserved in these examples, 
so long as they involve only a small range of beliefs. What 
I want to focus on for the rest of this paper are cases in 
which there is much more extensive abnormal epistemic 
change. If (P) is correct, we should expect to find that there 
is some sense, in such cases, that personal identity is at 
stake. (Since, as I have indicated, the notion of ‘too much’ 
abnormal change is vague, we need not expect a clear cut 
failure of identity. It will be enough if identity is 
problematic.) 
I shall concentrate on religious conversion, which, 
to my knowledge, has not been studied in this context. But 
first a few remarks about another, perhaps simpler case 
that will allow to me to make a methodological point. If 
somebody suffers a serious form of dementia (bringing 
with it a high degree of abnormal epistemic change), we 
find it not implausible, though not obligatory either, to 
conceptualize this in terms of failure of identity. The senile 
person is no longer the same person as she was before. 
We have a host of ways of talking about this that reflect 
ambivalence about the identity of the person with her 
former self: “so-and-so is no longer there”; “just a shadow 
of her former self”; and so on. Such locutions express, 
often in metaphorical ways, discontinuity. But I think there 
is no hard fact about whether talk of discontinuity itself 




functions merely as a metaphor for drastic change or as 
indicating a failure of identity. This can only be settled in 
the light of a theory of personal identity. But, along with 
Carol Rovane (1998, 59-64), I think that our normal 
conceptions of personal identity are sufficiently incoherent 
that any consistent theory will be revisionary. Such 
revisionary theories do not represent antecedent facts of 
the matter, so much as give us ways of conceptualizing the 
messy data that life provides. They should be judged by 
how fruitful they are in application to difficult cases. 
There are many modalities of religious conversion, 
gradual, reasonbased, pragmatic, etc. I shall confine 
myself to one modality: that in which a non-believer, as a 
result of a sudden particular experience, becomes a 
believer. I take it that in conversion, particularly of this 
sudden type, there is some sense that the identity of the 
pre- and post-conversion person is put into question. The 
language of being born again is testimony to this. Other 
language is also suggestive: “becoming Sons of God” (i.e. 
changing parentage), “the newness of life”, “being buried 
with Christ” (i.e. to mark the end of the previous life). If 
there were no limitations on the size of this paper, this 
would be the place to undertake an extensive examination 
of the religious language surrounding conversion, 
descriptions made by converts of their experiences, etc. As 
it is, I shall just take it for granted that identity is at least 
problematized. 
What kinds of changes in epistemic state are 
involved in conversion? Clearly, one comes to believe that 
God exists where before one either disbelieved this or was 
agnostic. But this is just the beginning. New ways of life 
will come with a whole host of new beliefs. Newly acquired 
love and fear of God will interact with beliefs in complex 
ways. There will also be changes in systemic features, 
such as what is taken as evidence for what. So, the 
changes in epistemic state will be many and ramified. 
However, we should also not ignore the obvious fact that 
there will be vast amounts of epistemic continuity. Very 
likely (in so far as such quantifications make sense at all) 
the bulk of our epistemic state will be unaffected, but the 
affected parts will be especially important. 
Will this epistemic change be abnormal? The three 
types of normal change, remember, were those brought 
about by a) more information; b) new skills in interpreting 
information; and c) application of our skills to our 
information. The changes wrought by sudden conversions 
obviously do not fall under c). It might seem as if such 
changes fall happily under a). The sudden conversion 
experience is one in which a person, say, hears a voice 
from Heaven; conversion is simply the response to this 
new information. But this is not quite right. The information 
itself is consistent with any number of interpretations. Why 
think that it is a sign of God? From the pre-conversion 
point of view, the possibility of such information would 
certainly be put down to some other type of cause. (I 
assume that the pre-conversion non-believer does not 
treat God’s existence as an ordinary empirical hypothesis 
for which certain events would be good evidence. Such a 
perspective is, surely, possible but my case is not an 
example of it.) 
By arguing in this way that the epistemic changes 
in conversion do not fall under a), it may seem as if they 
obviously do fall under b). What happens in conversion is 
not new information per se, although that might play some 
role. What seems essential is that one comes to see 
information in a different way. One is endowed with a new 
faculty, so to speak, which reveals the presence of God in 
things that one might have perceived before, but not have 
been able to detect God in. This seems promising as a 
way of understanding the epistemic changes in 
conversion. But this very fact should make us realize that 
the characterization of normal epistemic change above 
was too rough with respect to b). b) is in the definition of 
normal epistemic change to allow for certain types of new 
skills we may acquire. As we age, we may gain an 
emotional maturity that enables us better to understand 
people’s behavior. Furthermore, one may acquire skills 
deliberately, as when one learns a new language, or takes 
a class in accounting. It is cases such as these that lead to 
normal epistemic change. But when someone becomes 
paranoid, and so acquires a new ‘skill’ in seeing malicious 
motives behind apparently innocent actions, or if someone 
suddenly takes herself to understand the language of 
birds, this leads to abnormal epistemic change. How 
should we characterize the, I hope intuitive, differences 
between these types of cases? 
Not surprisingly, part of what makes some skills 
sources of normal epistemic change, and some of 
abnormal, has to do with the natural facts of human life. 
New skills involved in maturation happen naturally, as a 
part of ordinary development. Others, such as learning 
new languages, are the kinds of skills humans are well 
suited to acquire. Paranoia, at least of an extreme variety, 
is not a natural part of human life. This much almost 
everyone will agree too. But of course, there are likely to 
be differences of opinion about other skills as to whether or 
not they are natural. Many theists think that we naturally 
have an ability to sense God’s existence. Non-theists will 
disagree. The significance of this fact, for our present 
topic, is great. It means that there is no conception of the 
exact content of normal epistemic change that is 
independent of one’s epistemic starting point. Regarding 
the convert, there will be at least two different verdicts: 
from the non-believer (including the convert’s earlier self), 
that the epistemic change involved in conversion is 
abnormal; and from the believer (including the convert), 
that the change was normal, the effect of the de-occlusion 
of the formerly sin-impaired ability to sense the presence 
of God. 
If we can give no absolute answer to the question 
of whether the epistemic change in conversion is normal, 
is it impossible to assess whether we can match the way in 
which identity is put into question in conversion with the 
abnormality of the epistemic change involved? There are 
two possible answers to this question. First, we could say 
that the standards in play are those of the person to whom 
Reflection applies. Thus, from the non-believer’s point of 
view, the change in conversion would be abnormal. Hence, 
the questionableness of identity is matched by the 
abnormality of the epistemic change. Secondly, we could 
say that in cases, such as conversion, where the epistemic 
change induces a change in the very standards of what 
counts as normal epistemic change, whether the change is 
normal is relative to the standards used. In that case, the 
attempt in (R) to link Reflection with personal identity, 
through the notion of normal epistemic change (i.e. 
through (P)), will be vastly complicated, if not frustrated 
altogether. However, there need be no threat to (P) itself, if 
we accept that judgments of identity, like judgments of the 
normality of some epistemic change, may also be relative 
to epistemic standards. The non-believer, hypothesizing 
her own future conversion, might see this as bringing her 
continued identity into question; the believer may see it as 
a person having ‘found herself.’ That judgments of 
personal identity might be relative in this way may appear 
odd. In fact, it is the consequence of the fact already 
posited, that such judgments will be relative to a theory of 
personal identity. The different epistemic standards of what 
counts as normal epistemic change associated with the 
believer and the non-believer are likely to be associated, in 
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